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Abstract
Under the assumption that individuals know the conditional distributions of signals given
the payoﬀ-relevant parameters, existing results conclude that as individuals observe inﬁnitely
many signals, their beliefs about the parameters will eventually merge. We ﬁrst show that
these results are fragile when individuals are uncertain about the signal distributions: given
any such model, vanishingly small individual uncertainty about the signal distributions can lead
to substantial (non-vanishing) diﬀerences in asymptotic beliefs. Under a uniform convergence
assumption, we then characterize the conditions under which a small amount of uncertainty
leads to signiﬁcant asymptotic disagreement.
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1.1 Motivation
The common prior assumption is one of the cornerstones of modern economic analysis. Most
models assume that the players in a game have a common prior about the game form and
the payoﬀs. For example, they postulate that some state (e.g., a payoﬀ-relevant parameter)
θ is drawn from a commonly known distribution G,e v e nt h o u g he a c hp l a y e rm a ya l s oh a v e
additional information about some components of θ. The typical justiﬁcation for the common
prior assumption comes from learning; individuals, through their own experiences and the
communication of others, will have access to a history of events informative about the state
θ and this process will lead to “agreement” among individuals about the distribution of θ.A
strong version of this view is expressed in Savage (1954, p. 48) as the statement that a Bayesian
individual, who does not assign zero probability to “the truth,” will learn it eventually as long
as the signals are informative about the truth. An immediate implication of this result is that
two individuals who observe the same sequence of signals will ultimately agree, even if they
start with very diﬀerent priors.
Despite this powerful intuition, disagreement is the rule rather than the exception in prac-
tice. For example, there is typically considerable disagreement among economists working on
a certain topic. Similarly, there are deep divides about religious beliefs within populations
with shared experiences. In most cases, the source of disagreement does not seem to be dif-
ferences in observations or experiences. Instead, individuals appear to interpret the available
data diﬀerently. For example, an estimate showing that there are peer eﬀects is interpreted
very diﬀerently by two economists starting with diﬀerent priors. An economist believing that
peer eﬀects are small and unimportant appears more likely to judge the data or the methods
leading to this estimate to be unreliable and thus to attach less importance to this evidence.
In this paper, we investigate the outcome of learning about an underlying state by two
Bayesian individuals with diﬀerent priors when they are possibly uncertain about the con-
ditional distributions (or interpretations) of signals. This leads to a potential identiﬁcation
problem, as the same long-run frequency of signals may result at multiple states. Hence, even
though the individuals will learn the asymptotic frequency of signals, they may not always be
able to infer the state θ and initial diﬀerences in their beliefs may translate into diﬀerences
in asymptotic beliefs. When the amount of uncertainty is small, the identiﬁcation problem is
also small in the sense that each individual ﬁnds it highly likely that he will eventually assign
high probability to the true state. One may then expect that the asymptotic beliefs of the
1two individuals about the underlying states should be close as well. If so, the common prior
assumption would be a good approximation when players have a long common experience and
face only a small amount of uncertainty about how the signals are related to the states.
Our focus in this paper is to investigate the validity of this line of argument. In particular,
we study whether a small amount of uncertainty leads only to a small amount of disagreement
asymptotically. Our main result shows that this is never the case: for every model, there exists
a vanishingly small amount of uncertainty such that under this uncertainty both individuals
assign nearly probability 1 that they will asymptotically hold signiﬁcantly diﬀerent beliefs
about the underlying state. This result implies that learning foundations of common priors
are not as strong as generally presumed.
1.2 Formulation
Consider the following example, which illustrates the main ideas presented below. There are
two states θ ∈ {A,B} and binary signals st ∈ {a,b}. Two individuals with given priors publicly
observe a sequence of signals, {st}
n
t=1, and form their posteriors about the state θ. Conditional
on the state, the signals are independently and identically distributed, but the individuals do
not necessarily know this distribution. Letting pθ be this unknown probability of st = a at
state θ, we assume that each individual has a possibly non-degenerate belief about pθ.T h i s
belief has a cumulative distribution function Fi
θ; the density, when it exists, is denoted by fi
θ.
The standard model used for analysis of learning and agreement in the literature is the special
case of this environment where each Fi
θ puts all of its mass at some pθ,w i t hpA > 1/2 >p B.
Throughout, we refer to this benchmark as the (or a) “standard model”. Thus in contrast
to the standard model, where the informativeness of signals is known, the individuals in our
environments may face some uncertainty about the informativeness of signals. Consequently,
as they observe additional signals, they learn not only about the state θ, but also about the
interpretation of the signals. Our general model is introduced in Section 2 and the example
here is a special case that is discussed in greater detail in Section 3. In that section, using
an asset trading example, we illustrate how the failure of asymptotic agreement may have
signiﬁcant implications for game theoretic and economic analysis.
In Section 4, we ﬁrst extend existing results on asymptotic learning and agreement. In
particular, we show that when the supports of Fi
A and Fi
B are disjoint (which is signiﬁcantly
more general than the standard case where each Fi
θ has point mass), there is “full identiﬁcation”
for both individuals, in the sense that each can identify the state from the long-run frequency
2of signals (as n →∞ ). In this case, each individual is certain that he will eventually learn the
true state (asymptotic learning). Moreover, we show that under additional mild conditions,
each individual is also certain that they will eventually agree (asymptotic agreement).
A key observation of our paper is that asymptotic agreement under full identiﬁcation rests
on how individuals treat zero probability events. In particular, under full identiﬁcation, indi-
viduals do not question their models even along sample paths that are impossible according to
their model, because they attribute the frequencies that are outside the support of their model
to sampling variation, regardless of how unlikely such sampling variation may be and how large
their samples are. An implication is that along such sample paths their beliefs about the future
frequencies diverge from the empirical long-run frequency, leading to a form of inconsistency.
This inconsistency and the unwillingness of individuals to adjust their models in the face of
overwhelming evidence to the contrary are unappealing features of the standard formulation.
More importantly, support restrictions are clearly idealizations that equate small probabilities
with zero probability; they can be justiﬁed only when we know that behavior under small and
zero probabilities are similar. Whether or not this is so can only be studied by ﬁrst considering
models without such support restrictions.
Motivated by these observations, we relax all such support restrictions and instead assume
that each Fi
θ has full support. Under full support, as each individual observes additional
signals, his beliefs about the future frequencies approach the empirical long-run frequency. By
Bayes rule, beliefs about the underlying payoﬀ-relevant state are determined by the likelihood
ratio fi
B/fi
A of the densities at the realized long-run frequencies. Sampling variation (which
disappears due to the strong law of large numbers) plays no role in the formation of asymptotic
beliefs.
An immediate implication of the full support assumption is that there will be no full
identiﬁcation. Consequently, each individual recognizes that he will never fully learn the true
state, as some uncertainty about the informativeness of the signals and the state remains
forever. This also implies that, except for the knife-edge cases, each individual is also certain
that asymptotic agreement will fail, in the sense that some amount of diﬀerences of opinions
will remain forever.
The most substantive part of our paper, Section 5, investigates whether the amount of
disagreement is small (vanishing) when we are arbitrarily close to a fully-identiﬁed model. We








,w h e r e
each Fi
θ puts probability 1 on a single frequency pi
θ. We then consider families {Fi
θ,m} of dis-
3tributions with full support that become increasingly concentrated on pi
θ (as m →∞ ). Here,
af a m i l y{Fi
θ,m} is a possible relaxation of the idealized assumptions in the standard model.
Our main question is thus whether the amount of asymptotic disagreement vanishes in the
limit as m →∞(as the model is arbitrarily close to the standard model). Our ﬁrst main
result in this section shows that asymptotic agreement is never robust to all relaxations. More









construct a family {Fi
θ,m} of distributions that become more and more concentrated around
pi
θ, such that the amount of asymptotic disagreement eventually exceeds a ﬁxed positive level
for almost all sample paths and for all m. This result therefore implies that asymptotic agree-
ment is “fragile”–small perturbations of the standard model lead to signiﬁcant asymptotic
disagreement.
The idea underlying this fragility result is intuitive. As m →∞and we approach the
standard model, the identiﬁcation problem vanishes, in the sense that each individual i assigns
nearly probability 1 to the event that he will learn the true state. However, even though
asymptotic learning applies, asymptotic agreement is considerably more demanding. For as-
ymptotic agreement, each individual must also be certain that the other individual will also
eventually learn the true state. While this latter requirement is true in the standard model,
it is often not the case near the standard model. In particular, near any standard model,
each individual assigns a high probability to a small set of long-run frequencies (thus ensuring
asymptotic learning). Yet, even if F1
θ and F2
θ are very close to each other, the likelihood ratios
of the densities may remain signiﬁcantly diﬀerent on those sets. In particular, j m a ya s s i g na
low probability to the true state at the frequencies i ﬁnds likely. In that case, i would be nearly
certain that j will fail to learn the true state and the beliefs will be diﬀerent in the long run.
Importantly, this conclusion is true even for (instances of) the standard model when p1
θ = p2
θ,
so that the individuals agree on the likely frequencies.
Our second main result in Section 5 provides a tight characterization of the conditions
under which asymptotic agreement is fragile when the families of distributions {Fi
θ,m} is such
that the resulting likelihood ratios converge uniformly to a continuous function. This uniform
convergence requirement ensures that asymptotic beliefs are not highly sensitive to the long-run
frequency of signals as m →∞ . In the context of a canonical example, our characterization
shows that the asymptotic agreement results are fragile when the families of distributions
{Fi
θ,m} converging to the standard model have regularly-varying (polynomial) tails, such as the
Pareto or the log-normal distributions but not when they have rapidly-varying (exponential)
4tails, such as the normal and the exponential distributions.
Our third main result in Section 5 shows that agreement is “continuous” in the medium
run.1 Consider any standard model with asymptotic agreement and any family {Fi
θ,m} of
models converging to the standard model. For any model Fi
θ,m, individual beliefs may be far
apart at the beginning and also asymptotically (as n →∞ ). However, we show that in the
middle, the beliefs of the two individuals will be arbitrarily close to each other for long periods,
provided that m is suﬃciently large. The intuition for this result is as follows. The events
concerning a few signal realizations correspond to only “coarse” information. This information
is similar under Fi
θ,m and the standard model, so that individual beliefs are similar in the
two models and the disagreement decreases with more observations for a while. However,
eventually, individuals start using “ﬁner” information in updating their beliefs and it is this
ﬁner information that is diﬀerent under the two models. Therefore, eventually beliefs may
grow apart under Fi
θ,m, while they keep approaching each other under the standard model.
1.3 Interpretation
Our results cast doubt on the idea that the common prior assumption may be justiﬁed by
learning. They imply that in many environments, even when there is little uncertainty so that
each individual believes that he will learn the true state, Bayesian learning does not necessarily
imply agreement about the relevant parameters. Consequently, the strategic outcomes may be
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from those in the common-prior environments.2 Whether this common
prior assumption is warranted therefore depends on the speciﬁc setting and what type of
information individuals are trying to glean from the data.
The relevance of our results for theoretical modeling depends on whether our full-support
assumption is a better approximation to reality and a more useful modeling tool for certain
situations than the standard full-identiﬁcation assumption. The full-support assumption does
not rule out that pB, the unknown probability of st = a at state θ = B, is higher than pA,t h e
unknown probability of st = a at state θ = A. That is, the individual ﬁnds it possible (though
unlikely) that a signal st = a can be considered as evidence in favor of state B rather than A.
This is because the individual is uncertain not only about the informativeness of the signals
1We thank a referee for conjecturing such a result and encouraging us to investigate it further.
2See Section 3 for an example. For previous arguments on whether game-theoretic models should be for-
mulated with all individuals having a common prior, see, for example, Aumann (1986, 1998) and Gul (1998).
Gul (1998), for instance, questions whether the common prior assumption makes sense when there is no ex ante
stage.
5but also about their direction.3
It may at ﬁrst appear that individuals should always know whether a particular signal
value is evidence in favor of state A or state B. One might then argue that as an individual
observes more and more a signals, he should not decrease his belief that the state is A–that
is, beliefs should be monotone in frequencies. For example, this reasoning would suggest that
if a candidate for an internal promotion has more publications in a particular journal, then his
chances for promotion should also be higher. Likewise, if we keep ﬁnding radioactive residues
in various sites in a country, we should not decrease our belief that the country has a covert
nuclear weapons program.4
These intuitions are correct in fully-identiﬁed models, but not in our more general envi-
ronment.5 This is a strength–not a shortcoming–of our model. We now argue that these
intuitions are in fact not as compelling as they ﬁrst appear and rule out a range of relevant
empirical and theoretical possibilities.
Consider the internal promotion case ﬁrst. The department has voted for promotion and
the case comes before the president of the university, who is from an unrelated department.
The chair of the department tells her that journal A publishes only exceptional contributions to
the discipline, while journal B publishes minor contributions to the candidate’s ﬁeld. Suppose
that the candidate has 3 publications in journal A and 3 publications in journal B, and the
president approves the promotion. Now consider the case where the candidate had 2 more
publications in journal A. It is natural to suppose that she would be even more enthusiastic
about the case. Would she still be as enthusiastic about the promotion if the candidate had
20 publications in journal A? 200 more publications? 2000 more publications? Clearly, as we
increase the number of publications in journal A, the president will eventually start doubting
the description that journal A publishes only exceptional contributions and at some point will
start putting less weight on publications in journal A. Naturally, before seeing the candidate’s
publication record, she would have attached a very small probability to seeing 2000 publications
in journal A. But faced with such a promotion case, she would start questioning her working
hypothesis.
Similarly, ﬁnding nuclear residue in a site may be considered a strong evidence for a covert
3Note, however, that under {F
i
θ,m}, the probability that pB is higher than pA becomes vanishingly small as
m →∞ .
4We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting these examples.
5In fact, the full-identiﬁcation assumption is considerably stronger than monotonicity and hence full-
identiﬁcation assumption fails whenever asymptotic beliefs are non-monotone on some (possibly unlikely) events.
Theorem 5 below shows that our fragility results hold even when asymptotic beliefs are monotone in signal fre-
quencies (though naturally our results are not true under full identiﬁcation).
6nuclear weapons program. Finding residues in three diﬀerent sites would probably be consid-
ered a smoking gun. But what if we ﬁnd nuclear residues everywhere in the country? We
would presumably not conclude that there is a nuclear facility in every building in the country,
but start entertaining the hypothesis that the measurements are wrong or they are responding
to some other compound or to some speciﬁc feature of the geography of the country.
1.4 A Brief Literature Review
Blackwell and Dubins (1962) show that when two agents agree on zero probability events (i.e.,
their beliefs are absolutely continuous with respect to each other), asymptotically, they will
make the same predictions about future frequencies of signals. It is well-understood that the
absolute continuity assumption is crucial for such a merging of opinions and its relaxation can
lead to a failure of merging; see, for example, Freedman (1963, 1965), Diaconis and Freedman,
1986, Miller and Sanchirico (1999), and Stinchcombe (2005).6 For example, Freedman shows
that when there are inﬁnitely many signal values, an individual may put positive probability to
the conditional signal distributions that are arbitrarily close to the true signal distribution in
the product topology, but his future predictions may diverge dramatically from those of another
individual who knows the true signal distribution. This is because posterior beliefs may be
quite sensitive to the tail of the conditional signal distribution and the tails are negligible in
the product topology. Similarly, a number of important theorems in statistics, for example,
Berk (1966), show that when individuals place zero probability on the true data generating
process, limiting posteriors will have their support on the set of all identiﬁable values, but they
may fail to converge to a limiting distribution.
In contrast to the above-mentioned papers, we do not question the absolute continuity
assumption, as our full-support assumption implies absolute continuity. In particular, as in
Blackwell and Dubins’ theorem, the individuals asymptotically agree on the future frequency
of signals. Indeed, our results rely on the fact that agreeing about future frequencies is not
the same as agreeing about the underlying payoﬀ-relevant state, because of the identiﬁcation
problem that arises in the presence of uncertainty.7 This identiﬁcation problem leads to dif-
ferent possible interpretations of the same signal sequence by individuals with diﬀerent priors.
In most economic situations, what is important is not future frequencies of signals but some
6In dynamic games, another source of lack of merging is that some subgames are never visited along the
equilibrium path and thus players do not observe information that contradict their beliefs about payoﬀsi nt h e s e
subgames, failing to learn their payoﬀs (see, Fudenberg and Levine, 1993, Fudenberg and Kreps, 1995).
7In this respect, our paper is also related to Kurz (1994, 1996), who considers a situation in which agents
agree about long-run frequencies, but their beliefs fail to merge because of the non-stationarity of the world.
7payoﬀ-relevant parameter. For example, what is relevant for economists trying to evaluate a
policy is not the frequency of estimates on the eﬀect of similar policies from other researchers,
but the impact of this speciﬁc policy when (and if) implemented. Similarly, in the asset trading
example discussed in Section 3, what is most relevant is not the frequency of information about
the dividend process but the actual dividend that the asset will pay. Thus, many situations in
which individuals need to learn about a parameter or state that will determine their ultimate
payoﬀ as a function of their action falls within the realm of the analysis here. Our main re-
sults show that even when this identiﬁcation problem is negligible for individual learning, its
implications for asymptotic agreement may be signiﬁcant.
Our paper is also related to recent independent work by Cripps, Ely, Mailath and Samuelson
(2008), who study the conditions under which there will be “common learning” by two agents
observing correlated private signals. Cripps, et al. focus on a model in which individuals start
with common priors and then learn from private signals under certainty (though they note that
their results could be extended to the case of non-common priors). They show that individual
learning ensures “approximate common knowledge” when the signal space is ﬁnite, but not
necessarily when it is inﬁnite. In contrast, we focus on the case in which the agents start
with heterogenous priors and learn from public signals under (negligible) uncertainty.S i n c e
all signals are public in our model, there is no diﬃculty in achieving approximate common
knowledge.8
2M o d e l
There are two individuals, denoted by i ∈ {1,2}. The individuals care about a state θ,w h i c h
comes from a ﬁnite set Θ with K ≥ 2 elements. The individuals cannot observe the state,
but they publicly observe a sequence of signals {st}
n
t=1 where st ∈ Σ for some ﬁnite set Σ
with L ≥ 2 elements. We designate θ ∈ Θ and σ ∈ Σ as a generic state and a generic signal
value, respectively. We write ∆(Θ) ⊂ [0,1]
K and ∆(Σ) ⊂ [0,1]
L for the sets of all probability
distributions on Θ and Σ, respectively. We endow ∆(Θ) and ∆(Σ) with the supremum norm
k·k.A g e n ti assigns ex ante probability πi





θ∈Θ ∈ ∆(Θ) for the
vector of prior beliefs. The individuals believe that, given θ, the signals are exchangeable, i.e.,
they are independently and identically distributed with an unknown distribution.9 That is,
8Put diﬀerently, we ask whether a player thinks that the other player will learn, whereas Cripps et al. ask
whether a player i thinks that the other player j thinks that i thinks that j thinks that ... a player will learn.
9See, for example, Billingsley (1995). If there were only one state, then our model would be identical to De
Finetti’s canonical model (see, for example, Savage, 1954). In the context of this model, De Finetti’s theorem
8the probability of st = σ given θ is an unknown number pθ,σ. Here, pθ,σ c a nb ec o n s i d e r e da s
the long-run frequency of σ when the true state is θ.W ew r i t epθ ≡ (pθ,σ)σ∈Σ ∈ ∆(Σ).
Our main departure from the standard model is that we allow the individuals to be un-
certain about pθ. We denote the cumulative joint distribution function of pθ according to
individual i–namely, his subjective probability distribution–by Fi
θ. In the standard model, Fi
θ
is degenerate (Dirac) and puts probability 1 at some ˆ pi
θ. In contrast, for most of the analysis,
we will impose the following assumption:
Assumption 1 (Full Support) For each i and θ, Fi
θ has a continuous, non-zero and ﬁnite
density fi
θ over ∆(Σ).
The assumption implies that Fi
θ has a full support over the simplex ∆(Σ). Assumption 1 is
stronger than necessary for our results, but simpliﬁes the exposition. In addition, throughout
we assume that π1, π2, F1
θ and F2
θ are known to both individuals.10
We consider inﬁnite sequences s ≡ {st}
∞
t=1 of signals and write S for the set of all such
sequences. We write
φi
θ,n(s) ≡ Pri (θ |{ st}
n
t=1)
for the posterior probability that the true state is θ given a sequence of signals {st}
n
t=1 under
prior πi and subjective probability distribution Fi
θ.A f t e r o b s e r v i n g {st}
n
t=1, i assigns prob-
ability φi
θ,n(s) to state θ. Since the sequence of signals, s, is generated by an exchangeable
process, the order of the signals does not matter for the posterior. It only depends on
rσ,n(s) ≡ #{t ≤ n|st = σ},
the number of times st = σ out of ﬁrst n signals for each signal value σ ∈ Σ;w ew r i t e
rn (s) ≡ (rσ,n(s))σ∈Σ.11 Let us write
¯ S ≡ {s ∈ S|limn→∞ rσ,n(s)/n exists for each σ ∈ Σ} (1)
provides a Bayesian foundation for classical probability theory by showing that exchangeability (i.e., invariance
under permutations of the order of signals) is equivalent to having an independent identical unknown distrib-
ution and implies that posteriors converge to long-run frequencies. De Finetti’s decomposition of probability
distributions is extended by Jackson, Kalai and Smorodinsky (1999) to cover cases without exchangeability.
10Since our purpose is to understand whether learning justiﬁes the common prior assumption, we do not
assume a common prior, allowing agents to have diﬀering beliefs even when the beliefs are commonly known.
11Given the deﬁnition of rn (s), the probability distribution Pr





























9for the set of sequences under which the empirical frequency rσ,n(s)/n converges to some
long-run frequency and let us denote this long-run frequency of σ under s by
ρσ (s) ≡ limn→∞ rσ,n(s)/n. (2)
We denote the vector of long-run frequencies by ρ(s) ≡ (ρσ (s))σ∈Σ ∈ ∆(Σ). By the strong
law of large numbers, such a limit exists almost surely for both individuals, which implies that
Pri ¡
s ∈ ¯ S
¢
=1for i =1 ,2. We will often state our results for all sample paths s in ¯ S,w h i c h
equivalently implies that these statements are true almost surely or with probability 1. Now,














where Pri (rn|θ) is the probability of observing the signal st = σ exactly rσ,n times out of n
signals for each σ ∈ Σ with respect to the distribution Fi
θ.
The following lemma provides a useful formula for the asymptotic belief of individual i,
limn→∞ φi
θ,n(s), and introduces the concept of the asymptotic likelihood ratio. Both the
formula and the asymptotic likelihood ratio are used throughout the rest of the paper.




















is the asymptotic likelihood ratio for θ and θ0.
Proof. All proofs are in the Appendix.
In (5), Ri
θ,θ0 (ρ) is the asymptotic likelihood ratio of observing frequency vector ρ when the
true state is θ0 versus when it is θ. Lemma 1 states that, asymptotically, individual i uses
these likelihood ratios and the Bayes rule to compute his asymptotic posterior beliefs about θ.
Notice that φi
θ,∞ and Ri







The two questions of interest for us are:




=1for each θ and i =1 ,2.







=1for i =1 ,2.
Notice that both asymptotic learning and agreement are deﬁn e di nt e r m so ft h ee xa n t e
probability assessments of the two individuals.12 Therefore, asymptotic learning implies that
an individual believes that he or she will ultimately learn the truth, while asymptotic agreement
implies that both individuals believe that their assessments will eventually converge.13
3 A Binary Example
In this section, we illustrate the main idea of the paper using the following simple example.
We take Θ = {A,B} and Σ = {a,b}, so that there are two states and the signals are binary.
3.1 A Standard Model
We ﬁrst consider an instance of the standard model, where it is commonly known that pA,a =ˆ pA
and pB,b =ˆ pB for some ˆ pA, ˆ pB ∈ (1/2,1]. Now, suppose that ra,n out of the ﬁrst n signals
are a. The likelihood of this event is ˆ p
ra,n
A (1 − ˆ pA)
n−ra,n under θ = A and ˆ p
n−ra,n
B (1 − ˆ pB)
ra,n













Suppose that n →∞and ra,n/n → ρa.I fˆ p
ρa
A (1 − ˆ pA)
1−ρa > ˆ p
1−ρa
B (1 − ˆ pB)
ρa (so that ρa is
more likely under A than under B), then the expression in the parentheses is greater than
1, and R(ra,n,n) →∞ . In that case, asymptotically, each individual assigns probability 1
to state A. When the true state is A, ra,n/n → ˆ pA. Therefore, as n →∞ , both individuals
assign probability 1 to the true state,. Similarly, when the true state is B, ra,n/n converges
to 1 − ˆ pB, and since the expression in the parentheses is now less than 1, R(ra,n,n) → 0.I n
that case, both individuals assign probability 1 to the true state B, asymptotically. Except
for the knife-edge case ˆ p
ρa
A (1 − ˆ pA)
1−ρa =ˆ p
1−ρa
B (1 − ˆ pB)
ρa, both individuals asymptotically
assign probability 1 to the same state, leading to asymptotic agreement.
12We formulate asymptotic learning and agreement in terms of each individual’s initial probability measure
so as not to take a position on what the “objective” for “true” probability measure is. Under Assumption 1,
asymptotic learning and agreement occur if and only if the corresponding limits hold for almost all long-run
frequencies ρ(s) ∈ ∆(Σ) under the Lebesgue measure, which has also an “objective” meaning.
13In a strategic situation, the players may care both about θ and the future signal frequencies. In that case,
for asymptotic agreement, one may ask that both posteriors about θ and the future frequencies merge. The
two concepts are equivalent under the full support assumption, since, in this case, the beliefs about the future
frequencies merge.
113.2 A Model with Small Uncertainty
Now, we consider the case in which each individual faces a small amount of uncertainty about
the conditional signal distributions. The individuals’ beliefs about the conditional distributions
are slightly diﬀerent. For some small  ,λ ∈ (0,1), each individual i thinks that with probability
1− , pθ is in a λ-neighborhood of some ˆ pi
θ > (1 + λ)/2, but with probability  , the signals are
not informative. More precisely, for ˆ pi
θ > (1 + λ)/2 and λ<
¯ ¯ˆ p1
θ − ˆ p2
θ




  +( 1−  )/λ if pθ,θ ∈
¡
ˆ pi





for each θ and i. Here, pθ,θ is pA,a for θ = A and pB,b for θ = B. Also, one can pick ˆ p1
θ, ˆ p2
θ,
and ˆ pθ close to each other and pick   and λ very small, so that each individual’s beliefs are
approximately the same as in the standard model discussed in the previous subsection. Now,
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 λ ifρa ∈ Di
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1 − ˆ pi





This and other relevant functions are plotted in Figure 1 for   → 0, λ → 0. The likelihood ratio
Ri
A,B (ρ) is 1 when ρa is small, takes a very high value at 1 − ˆ pi
B,g o e sd o w nt o1 afterwards,
becomes nearly zero around ˆ pi
A,a n dt h e nj u m p sb a c kt o1.B yL e m m a1 ,φi
A,∞ (ρ) will also be
non-monotone: when ρa is small, the signals are not informative, thus φi
A,∞ (ρ) i st h es a m ea s
the prior, πi
A. In contrast, around ρa =1− ˆ pi
B, the signals become very informative suggesting
that the state is B,t h u sφi
A,∞ (ρ) ∼ = 0. After this point, the signals become uninformative again
and φi
A,∞ (ρ) goes back to πi
A. Around ˆ pi
A, the signals are again informative, but this time
favoring state A,s oφi
A,∞ (ρ) ∼ = 1. Finally, signals again become uninformative and φi
A,∞ (ρ)
falls back to πi
A.
Intuitively, when ρa (s) is around 1− ˆ pi
B or ˆ pi
A, the individual assigns very high probability
to the true state, but outside of this region, he sticks to his prior, concluding that the signals
are not informative.
The ﬁrst important observation is that even though φi
A,∞ is equal to the prior for a large
range of limiting frequencies, as   → 0 and λ → 0 each individual attaches probability 1 to
the event that he will learn θ. This is because, as   → 0 and λ → 0, each individual becomes
convinced that the limiting frequencies will be close to either 1 − ˆ pi
B or ˆ pi
A.T h u s , t h e r e i s
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Figure 1: The three panels show, respectively, the approximate values of Ri
A,B, φi
A,∞,a n d ¯ ¯φ1
A,∞ − φ2
A,∞
¯ ¯ as   → 0 for ˆ pi
A =ˆ pi
B =ˆ pi.
However, asymptotic learning is considerably weaker than asymptotic agreement. Each
individual also understands that since λ<
¯ ¯ˆ p1
θ − ˆ p2
θ
¯ ¯, when the long-run frequency is in a
region where he learns that θ = A, the other individual will conclude that the signals are
uninformative and adhere to his prior belief. Consequently, he expects the posterior beliefs
of the other individual to be always far from his. Put diﬀerently, as   → 0 and λ → 0,e a c h
individual believes that he will learn the value of θ himself but that the other individual will fail
to learn. Therefore, each attaches probability 1 to the event that they disagree. This can be
seen from the third panel of Figure 1; at each sample path in ¯ S, at least one of the individuals
will fail to learn, and the diﬀerence between their limiting posteriors will be uniformly higher
than the following “objective” bound













A =1 /3 and π2
A =2 /3, this bound is equal to 1/3. In fact, the belief of each
individual regarding potential disagreement can be greater than this; each individual be-
lieves that he will learn but the other individual will fail to do so. Consequently, for each
i, Pri ¡¯ ¯φ1
A,∞ (ρ) − φ2
A,∞ (ρ)
¯ ¯ ≥ Z
¢
≥ 1 −  ,w h e r ea s  → 0,









This “subjective” bound can be as high as 1/2.
Clearly, we can pick ˆ p1
θ ∼ = ˆ p2
θ ∼ = ˆ pθ and   ∼ = λ ∼ = 0, so that each individual’s beliefs is
approximately the same as in the above instance of the standard model. Yet, our individuals
are certain that their beliefs will remain far apart as they observe the public signals, while the
individuals in the standard model are certain that their beliefs will merge eventually.14




θ, and uncertainty, i.e.,
  6=06= λ, are important for this discontinuity.
133.3 A Model of Asset Trading
Failure of asymptotic agreement may have major implications in a game theoretical analysis,
as the following simple asset trading example illustrates.15
There are three dates, τ =0 ,1,2, two players and and an asset that yields a dividend only
at date 2. The asset pays 1 if the state is A and 0 if the state is B. Player 2 owns the asset,
but Player 1 would like to buy it because he is more optimistic: π1
A >π 2
A. Between the dates
τ =0and τ =1 , the players observe a sequence s ≡ {st}
∞
t=1 of signals. Player 1 has all the
bargaining power: at each date Player 1 makes a take-it-or-leave-it price oﬀer Qτ,a n dt r a d e
occurs at price Qτ if Player 2 accepts the oﬀer. We are interested in the subgame-perfect
equilibrium of this game.
Let us start with the standard (learning) model. At τ =1 ,a f t e ro b s e r v i n gs,e x c e p tf o rt h e
knife-edge case, the individuals have the same belief about θ, and hence they are indiﬀerent
toward trading the asset (at price Q1 = φ1
A,∞ (ρ(s)) = φ2
A,∞ (ρ(s))). In particular, at τ =0 ,
both individuals believe that the price at τ =1will be 1 if the state is A and 0 if the state is
B, leaving both players indiﬀerent. Hence, if trade does not occur at τ =0 , the continuation
value of Player 1 is 0, and the continuation value of Player 2 is π2
A. If they trade at price Q0,
then the continuation value of players 1 and 2 will be π1
A − Q0 and Q0, respectively. Thus at
date 0, Player 2 will accept an oﬀer if and only if Q0 ≥ π2
A.S i n c eπ1
A >π 2
A,P l a y e r1o ﬀers
Q0 = π2
0 at date τ =0and trade takes place. Therefore, in any subgame-perfect equilibrium,
there is immediate trade at τ =0 .
We next turn to the model with small uncertainty, discussed in the previous subsection. In
particular, suppose that in terms of the example there we have   ∼ = λ ∼ = 0. We will then show








then the value of the asset for Player 2 is φ2
A,∞ (ρ(s)) = π2
A, and the value of the asset for
Player 1 is approximately 1. Hence, at such ρ(s), Player 1 will buy the asset from Player 2
at price Q1 (ρ(s)) = π2
A, enjoying gains from trade equal to 1 − π2
A. On the other hand, if
ρa (s) ∈ D1
B or ρa (s) ∈ D2
A, there will be no trade at date 1. For example, if ρa (s) ∈ D1
B,
Player 2 assigns probability π2
A to state A, accepting an oﬀer Q1 only if Q1 ≥ π2
A. But since
Player 1 assigns nearly probability 0 to state A, he would prefer not to trade at such a price.







15See Acemoglu, Chernozhukov and Yildiz (2006) for a more general model of asset trading under learning
under uncertainty.
14(when   → 0). The continuation value of Player 2 in this case is π2
A, since he only trades at
his continuation value. Therefore, at date 0, Player 2 would accept a price oﬀer Q0 only if
Q0 ≥ π2
A.B u ts u c ha no ﬀer would leave Player 1 at most a surplus of π1
A−π2
A.S i n c eπ1
A−π2
A is






, there will be no trade at τ =0 . Instead,
in any subgame-perfect equilibrium, Player 1 waits for the information to buy the asset at date
1( p r o v i d e dt h a tρ(s) turns out to be in a range where he concludes that the asset pays 1).
This example highlights two important implications of the type of learning analyzed in
this paper for game theoretic and economic analysis. First, for players’ behavior at τ =1
after observing s the crucial question is whether their beliefs will be close to each other after
observing s at τ =1 . If so, then their behavior will be very similar to that postulated in
the standard (learning) model. Second, for players’ behavior at τ =0 , the crucial question is
whether each player assigns high probability at τ =0to the event that their beliefs will be
similar at τ =1(as in our deﬁnition of asymptotic agreement). If so, then the continuation
values of each player will be as in the standard model, leading them to behave accordingly.
Otherwise, they may behave quite diﬀerently, as our example has illustrated.
This example also illustrates that it is not suﬃcient for each individual to be certain that
he will learn the truth for the equilibrium to be similar to that resulting under do standard
(learning) model. When individuals are uncertain about pθ, each is certain that he will learn
the true state but is also certain that the other player will fail to do so. This assessment then
induces each to wait for the arrival of additional information before trading.16
4 Asymptotic Learning and Agreement–Preliminary Results
In this section we return to the general environment introduced in Section 2 and consider two
polar benchmarks, one in which the model is fully identiﬁed as in the standard model and one
under our full-support assumption, Assumption 1. In each case we characterize whether the
individuals will eventually learn the truth and whether they will agree asymptotically. Under
full identiﬁcation, asymptotic learning and agreement apply under relatively mild conditions.
Under full support, the individuals never learn the truth and their beliefs “generically” diverge.
These preliminary results will provide the starting point for our main results on fragility of
asymptotic agreement presented in the next section.
16This contrasts with the intuition that observation of common information should take agents towards
common beliefs and make trades less likely. This intuition is correct in models of learning under full identiﬁcation
and is the reason why previous models have generated speculative trade early in the game (e.g., Harrison and
Kreps (1978) and Morris (1996)).






for the smallest closed set to which Fi
θ assigns probability 1. That is,
R
supp(F) dFi









In this subsection, we assume that the supports of the frequencies are disjoint under diﬀerent
states, which ensures that the model is fully identiﬁed.











We next establish asymptotic learning and agreement under this full-identiﬁcation assump-
tion and an additional genericity assumption. To state this characterization result, we ﬁrst










as the set of frequency vectors p (among those that i initially ﬁnds possible) that are closest
to ρ a c c o r d i n gt oc r o s s - e n t r o p yH.W eu s e#Pi (ρ) to denote the number of elements in the
set Pi (ρ). Our genericity assumption is presented next.





is in the interior





, #Pj(ρ)=1(for j 6= i).
This assumption is imposed for expositional simplicity and will be used only in the following
result. It holds generically in the sense that any Fi
θ can be approximated by distributions that
satisfy it. (Note that for any ˆ p ∈ Pj (ρ) and ε ∈ (0,1), Pj (ερ +( 1− ε)ˆ p)={ˆ p}.)
Theorem 1 (Asymptotic Learning and Agreement under Full Identiﬁcation) Sup-













=1if and only if Pj(ρ) ⊆ supp(F
j
θ) for all ρ ∈
supp(Fi
θ) and all θ.
17The cross-entropy function is closely related to Kullback-Leibler divergence in information theory and is
often used as a measure of distance between two probability distributions. In particular, the Kullback-Leibler
divergence of p from ρ is H (ρ,p) − H(p,p),w h e r eH (p,p) is also the entropy of p. See, for example, Burnham
and Anderson (1989).
16The ﬁrst part of the theorem states that full identiﬁcation ensures asymptotic learning.
The second part provides necessary and suﬃcient conditions for asymptotic agreement. In
particular, under full identiﬁcation there will be asymptotic agreement if and only if the sup-
ports of F1
θ and F2
θ are close enough according to cross-entropy, in the sense that the closest
point among ∪θ0supp(F
j
θ0) to a point in supp(Fi
θ) lies in supp(F
j
θ).I ti sr e m a r k a b l et h a ta s y m p -
totic agreement is a property of the supports. In particular, the common support assumption
implies asymptotic agreement. This is stated in the next corollary.
Corollary 1 (Common Support) Under Assumptions 2, if supp(F1
θ )=supp(F2
θ ) for all






A special case of the corollary is the following well-known result of Savage (1954), which
was already discussed in the context of the Binary Example. Savage’s result is the basis of the
argument that Bayesian learning will push individuals towards common beliefs and priors.
Corollary 2 (Savage’s Theorem) Assume that each Fi
θ puts probability 1 on ˆ pθ for some
ˆ pθ such that ˆ pθ 6=ˆ pθ0 for all θ 6= θ0. Then asymptotic learning and agreement always obtain,














It is useful to spell out the intuition for Theorem 1 and Corollary 2. Let us start with
the latter. Corollary 2 states that when the individuals know the conditional distributions of
the signals (and hence they agree what those distributions are), they will learn the truth with
experience (almost surely as n →∞ ) and two individuals observing the same sequence will
necessarily come to agree on what the underlying state, θ, is. A simple intuition for this result
is that the underlying state θ is fully identiﬁed from the limiting frequencies, so that both
individuals can infer the underlying state from the observation of the limiting frequencies of
signals.18
However, there is more to this corollary than this simple intuition. Each individual is sure
that, at state θ, they will be confronted with a limiting frequency of ˆ pθ, in which case they
18In our working paper, we also identiﬁed other conditions, such as symmetric supports, that ensure asymptotic
learning and agreement according to our characterization, showing that asymptotic learning and agreement are
substantially more general than Savage’s original theorem, presented here in Corollary 2. All of these results
also rely on the full-identiﬁcation assumption (thus implicitly imposing that Assumption 1 does not hold).
17will conclude that the true state is θ; and they attach zero probability to the events that they
will observe a diﬀerent asymptotic frequency. To elaborate this point, consider the following
crucial question:
What happens if an individual observes a frequency ρ of signals diﬀerent from every
ˆ pθ in a large sample of size n?
The answer to this question highlights why asymptotic agreement under the standard model
rests on problematic assumptions and also provides the intuition for our characterization and
some of our main results. First, note that the event in the question has zero probability
under the individual’s beliefs at the limit n = ∞. However, for n<∞ any frequency has
strictly positive probability because of sampling variation. In particular, the individual expects
frequency ρ to occur with probability e−H(ρ,ˆ pθ)n under state θ w h e nt h es a m p l es i z ei sn.F o r
any θ with ˆ pθ ∈ Pi (ρ) and θ0 with ˆ pθ0 6∈ Pi (ρ), this event is inﬁnitely more likely under





for some θ(ρ) ∈ Θ,a sn →∞ , he becomes increasingly certain that the
long-run frequency is ˆ pθ(ρ), which is distinct from ρ, and assigns probability 1 to state θ(ρ).
Crucially, the individual reaches this inference despite the fact that as n →∞ , frequency ρ
has zero probability under θ(ρ). The fact that full identiﬁcation relies on inference based on
such zero probability events is the problematic aspect of the standard model (see below for a
further discussion).
The intuition for Theorem 1 is very similar to that of Corollary 2. Now, i believes that
as n →∞ , under each θ, the empirical frequency will converge to some ρ ∈ supp(Fi
θ),a n di
will assign probability 1 to state θ. What happens if ρ 6∈∪ θ0supp(F
j
θ0)? Then, j presumes
that this has resulted from sampling variation. That is, he thinks that the actual long-run
frequency is some p ∈∪ θ0supp(F
j
θ0), but the sampling variation leads to ρ, which has probability
e−H(ρ,p)n.S u p p o s e Pj(ρ) is a singleton with its unique element ˆ pθj(ρ) from supp(F
j
θj(ρ)) for
some θj (ρ) ∈ Θ. Then, once again, as n →∞ , the likelihood of ρ is inﬁnitely greater under
ˆ pθj(ρ) than any other p.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,j assigns probability 1 to the event that the actual long-
run frequency is ˆ pθj(ρ) and the true state is θj (ρ). There will be asymptotic agreement on such
a sample path if and only if θj (ρ)=θ. When the supports of Fi
θ and F
j
θ are suﬃciently close,
this condition is satisﬁed and there will be asymptotic agreement. In contrast, if the supports
were far apart, so that θj (ρ) 6= θ,t h e ni would assign positive probability to the event that their
beliefs would diverge to the extremes and we would thus have limn→∞
° °φ1
n (s) − φ2
n (s)
° ° =1 .
18Now we can see even more explicitly that the behavior of individual i’s beliefs when
ρ(s) 6∈∪ θ0supp(Fi
θ0) is problematic. First, individual i never questions the validity of his model
even though the reality is increasingly inconsistent with this model (since ρ(s) 6∈∪ θ0supp(Fi
θ0)).
As we discussed in the Introduction, in practice we expect individuals to revise their models
and working hypotheses when faced with overwhelming evidence inconsistent with their as-
sumptions. Second, individual i’s beliefs (at sample path s) concerning future frequencies













)σ∈Σ ∈ Pi (ρ(s)) ⊂∪ θ0supp(Fi
θ0) while ρ(s) 6∈∪ θ0supp(Fi
θ0).
This is despite the fact that his model prescribes a symmetric world due to exchangeability.







)σ∈Σ = ρ(s) ∀s ∈ ¯ S,
so that individuals’ beliefs about the future frequencies always converge to the empirical fre-
quency.19
This discussion suggests that the full-identiﬁcation assumption leads to a range of problem-
atic conclusions when individuals observe “surprising” frequencies (because individuals always
ascribe these frequencies to sampling variability). It also suggests that equating small proba-
bility events with zero probability events may have important implications and consequences.
To investigate these issues systematically, we next turn to the case in which the full-support
assumption applies.
4.2 Failure of Asymptotic Learning and Agreement with Full Support
We next impose Assumption 1 and show that when Fi
θ has full support, there will be neither
asymptotic learning nor asymptotic agreement.
Theorem 2 ( L a c ko fA s y m p t o t i cL e a r n i n ga n dA g r e e m e n tU n d e rF u l lS u p p o r t )
Under Assumption 1, for all θ and i,
1. Pri ¡
φi
θ,∞ (ρ(s)) 6=1 |θ
¢
=1 ,a n d
19This claim can be readily proved following the same steps as in the proof of Lemma 3 in the Appendix since
P
i (ρ)={ρ} for all ρ and i under the full-support assumption.
192. under the Euclidean metric on real numbers and the Lp metric on density functions,






i,θ such that for each i ∈ {1,2},
Pri ¡
φ1




Under the full support assumption, Theorem 2 leads to the opposite of the conclusions
drawn from Theorem 1. The ﬁrst conclusion of Theorem 2 states that each individual is certain
that he will not learn the truth. This is simply because the likelihood ratio Ri
θ,θ0 never takes
values of 0 or ∞, and hence, by Lemma 1, i would never put probability 1 on any state. That
is, on every sample path s ∈ S, his probability assessment of each state remains bounded away
from 0, eventually. The second conclusion states that, generically, he is also certain that their
beliefs will never merge, and there will always be some diﬀerence of opinions. This is also an
immediate implication of Lemma 1. Under the full-support assumption, the asymptotic beliefs
vary with the parameters of the individual’s subjective model, and asymptotic agreement at

















Clearly, these equalities are “knife-edge” and a small perturbation always ensures that they
are not satisﬁed almost everywhere (according to the Lebesgue measure on ∆(Σ)). Thus,






i,θ, there will be no asymptotic agreement under full
support.
There is a simple intuition for the lack of learning. Under full support, an individual is
never sure about the exact interpretation of the sequence of signals he observes and will update
his views about pθ (the informativeness of the signals) as well as his views about the underlying
state. For example, even when signal a is more likely in state A than in state B,av e r yh i g h
frequency of a will not necessarily convince him that the true state is A, because he may infer
that the signals are not as reliable as he initially believed and they may instead be biased
towards a. Therefore, the individual never becomes certain about the state. This is captured
by the fact that Ri
θ,θ0 (ρ) deﬁned in (5) never takes the value zero or inﬁnity.
Nevertheless, Theorem 1 may be more robust than Theorem 2 appears to suggest. Under
the idealized full-identiﬁcation assumption, Theorem 1 showed that individuals expect to assign
exactly probability 1 to the true state and the asymptotic disagreement is exactly 0 (under some
additional mile conditions). When this idealized assumption is relaxed, these conclusions may
no longer hold. But this is simply because the individuals do not assign exactly probability 1 to
any state. This does not, however, rule out the possibility that Theorem 1 is robust in the sense
20that the amount of asymptotic disagreement is small in the neighborhood of fully identiﬁed
models, e.g., when the amount of uncertainty about the conditional signal distributions is
small.
5 Fragility of Asymptotic Agreement–Main Results
In this section, we investigate whether as the amount of uncertainty about the interpretation
of the signals disappears, the amount of asymptotic disagreement vanishes continuously. We
ﬁrst show that this is not the case: one can perturb a standard model of learning under
certainty slightly and obtain a model in which there is a substantial amount of asymptotic
disagreement. We establish such a discontinuity for every model with certainty, including the
canonical model of learning under certainty, where both individuals share the same beliefs
regarding the conditional signal distributions. We then restrict our perturbations by imposing
a uniform convergence assumption. Within this class, we characterize the perturbations under
which the amount of asymptotic disagreement vanishes continuously.
For any ˆ p ∈ ∆(Σ),w r i t eδˆ p for the Dirac distribution that puts probability 1 on p =ˆ p.L e t
{Fi
θ,m}m∈N,i∈{1,2},θ∈Θ ({Fi
θ,m} for short) denote an arbitrary sequence of subjective probability
distributions converging to a Dirac distribution δpi
θ for each (i,θ) as m →∞ . (We will simply
say that {Fi
θ,m} converges to δpi
θ). Throughout it is implicitly assumed that there is asymptotic
agreement under δpi
θ (as in Theorem 1). Therefore, as m →∞ , uncertainty about the inter-
pretation of the signals disappears and we converge to a model with asymptotic agreement.
We write Pri
m for the ex ante probability under (Fi
θ,m)θ∈Θ, φi
θ,∞,m for the asymptotic posterior




θ,m for the long-run likelihood
ratio.
We ﬁrst observe that learning is continuous at certainty in the following sense:



























This theorem states that as {Fi
θ,m} converges to δpi
θ, each individual becomes increasingly
convinced that he will learn the true state. Equivalently, when a model of learning under
21certainty is perturbed, deviations from full learning will be small and each individual will
attach a probability arbitrarily close to 1 that he will eventually learn the payoﬀ-relevant state
variable θ. Hence, the ﬁrst part of Theorem 1, which concerns asymptotic learning, is robust.
We next deﬁne the continuity of asymptotic agreement at certainty and show that, in
contrast to the ﬁrst part, the second part of Theorem 1 is not robust.
Deﬁnition 1 For any given family {Fi
θ,m}, we say that asymptotic agreement is contin-
uous at certainty under {Fi














2K if it is
continuous at certainty under all families {Fi
θ,m} converging to δpi
θ.
Continuity at certainty requires that as the family of subjective probability distributions
converge to a Dirac distribution (at which there is asymptotic agreement), each individual
becomes increasingly certain that asymptotic disagreement will be arbitrarily small. Hence,








if there exists a family
{Fi
θ,m} converging to δpi










for i =1 ,2. We will next deﬁne a stronger notion of discontinuity.
Deﬁnition 2 We say that asymptotic agreement is strongly discontinuous at cer-
tainty under {Fi




















Strong discontinuity requires that even as we approach the world of learning under certainty,
asymptotic agreement will fail with probability approximately equal to 1 according to both
individuals. Finally, we introduce an even a stronger notion of discontinuity.
22Deﬁnition 3 We say that asymptotic agreement is almost-surely discontinuous at
certainty under {Fi
θ,m} if there exist ε>0 and ¯ m<∞ such that for all m>¯ m and
ρ ∈ ∆(Σ),
° °φ1
∞,m (ρ) − φ2
∞,m (ρ)
° ° >ε .




2K if it is almost-surely discontinuous at certainty under some family {Fi
θ,m}
(with possibly discontinuous density functions) converging to δpi
θ.
Almost-sure discontinuity requires that on every sample path s ∈ ¯ S,w i t hw e l l - d e ﬁned
long-run frequency ρ(s), asymptotic beliefs will be bounded away from each other. Hence,
almost surely, there will be a signiﬁcant asymptotic disagreement. In contrast, strong disconti-
nuity only requires that individuals assign high probabilities to those sample paths. Therefore,
almost-sure discontinuity implies strong discontinuity, and strong discontinuity implies discon-
tinuity.
5.1 Discontinuity of Asymptotic Agreement





2K.M o r e o v e r ,i fπ1 6= π2, then asymptotic agreement is almost-





That is, for every model with certainty, one can introduce a vanishingly small uncertainty
in such a way that the individuals’ asymptotic beliefs remain substantially diﬀerent from each
other at almost all sample paths. Therefore, the asymptotic agreement results are always
fragile. The proof is based on a perturbation as in the Binary Example introduced in Section
3.
Example 1 (Discontinuity of Asymptotic Agreement) In Section 3.2, for each m,t a k e
  = λ =¯  /m, ˆ p1
θ =ˆ pθ + λ,a n dˆ p2








A/2 for ρa ∈ Di










1 − ˆ pi
B − λ/2,1 − ˆ pi
B + λ/2
¢
). Such ¯   exists (by asymptotic
learning of i). By construction, each Fi
θ,m converges to the beliefs in the standard model, and
¯ ¯ˆ p1
θ − ˆ p2
θ
¯ ¯ >λfor each θ. To see strong discontinuity, consider the bound ¯ Z = z/2 > 0 with
z as in (9). By the choice of ¯  ,
¯ ¯φ1
A,∞,m (ρ) − φ2
A,∞,m (ρ)


















¯ ¯ > ¯ Z
¢
=1 . (10)
23This establishes that agreement is strongly discontinuous under {Fi
θ,m}.
To show almost-sure discontinuity, consider the bound ˜ Z =˜ z/2, which is positive when
π1 6= π2,w h e r e˜ z is as deﬁn e di n( 8 ) . C l e a r l y ,
¯ ¯φ1
A,∞,m (ρ) − φ2
A,∞,m (ρ)











¯ ¯ > ˜ Z when ρa 6∈ Di
A ∪ Di
B.T h a ti s ,
at each frequency, the asymptotic disagreement exceeds ˜ Z, showing that agreement is almost-
surely discontinuous under {Fi
θ,m}.
In the Binary Example (and in the proof of Theorem 4), the likelihood ratio Ri
θ,θ0,m (ρ(s))
and the asymptotic beliefs φi
θ,∞,m (ρ(s)) are non-monotone in the frequency ρ(s).T h i s i s a
natural outcome of uncertainty on conditional signal distributions (see the discussion in the
Introduction and Figure 2 below). In the Binary Example, when Ri
θ,θ0,m is monotone and the
amount of uncertainty is small, at each state one of the individuals assigns high probability
that both of them will learn the true state and consequently asymptotic disagreement will
be small. Nevertheless, asymptotic agreement is still discontinuous at uncertainty when we
impose the monotone likelihood ratio property. This is shown in the next theorem.
Theorem 5 (Discontinuity under Monotonicity) Take Θ = {A,B} and Σ = {a,b}.
Take any π1
A,π2
B ∈ (0,1) and for each i ∈ {1,2} take any ˆ pi
A and ˆ pi
B with ˆ pi
A,a > 1/2 and
ˆ pi
B,b > 1/2. There exist a family {Fi
θ,m} a n ds u c ht h a t :
1. Fi
θ,m converges to δˆ pi
θ for each θ and i;
2. the likelihood ratio Ri
A,B,m (ρ) is nonincreasing in ρa for each i and m,w h e r eρ =
(ρa,1 − ρa),a n d
3. agreement is discontinuous at certainty under {Fi
θ,m}.
The monotonicity of the likelihood ratio has weakened the conclusion of Theorem 4. Now,
asymptotic agreement is discontinuous at certainty, but it is not almost-surely or strongly
discontinuous.
In the proof of Theorem 4, the family {Fi
θ,m} leading to the discontinuity of asymptotic
agreement induces discontinuous likelihood ratios. This is not important for the results (except
for almost-sure discontinuity) because smooth approximations to Fi
θ,m would ensure continuity
of the likelihood ratios. More importantly, the likelihood ratio Ri
A,B,m converges point-wise to a
continuous function (i.e., limm Ri
A,B,m (ρ)=1for each ρ), but this convergence is not uniform.
The failure of uniform convergence is crucial for the stark discontinuity results above, as we
establish next.
245.2 A Characterization of Continuity with Uniform Convergence
We now assume that the likelihood ratio function Ri
θ,θ0,m uniformly converges to a (continuous)
function in the relevant regions and characterize the perturbations under which the asymptotic
agreement is continuous.
Let Ri
θ,θ0,∞ (ρ)=l i m m→∞ Ri
θ,θ0,m (ρ) be the pointwise limit of Ri
θ,θ0,m (ρ) in the extended
reals. It must be emphasized that the limiting asymptotic likelihood ratio, Ri
θ,θ0,∞,i sd i s t i n c t
from the asymptotic likelihood ratio in the limiting model. For example, in Example 1, Ri
θ,θ0,∞
is identically 1. On the other hand, the limiting model speciﬁes that each individual i is certain
that pθ,θ =ˆ pθ. Consequently, in the limiting model, the asymptotic likelihood ratio is 0 around
ρa = pA and ∞ around ρa =1−ˆ pB. Under uniform convergence, our characterization theorem
establishes that whether asymptotic agreement holds is tied to the value of Ri
θ,θ0,∞ at the
relevant frequencies, and it has no connection to the likelihood ratio in the limiting model:
Theorem 6 (Characterization under Uniform Convergence) Under Assumption 1,
consider any {Fi
θ,m} converging to δpi
θ where pi
θ 6= pi
θ0 for all distinct θ and θ0 and (m,i).




, there exists an open neighborhood V i
θ of pi
θ on which Ri
θ,θ0,m
converges uniformly to Ri
θ,θ0,∞. Then, the following are true.
1. Asymptotic agreement is continuous at certainty under {Fi
















6=0for all i 6= j and θ 6= θ0, then asymptotic agreement is strongly
discontinuous at certainty under {Fi
θ,m}.
The characterization establishes that whether asymptotic agreement is continuous at cer-
tainty depends on whether the limiting asymptotic likelihood ratio for states θ and θ0 according
to j, R
j
θ,θ0,∞, is equal to 0 at the frequency pi
θ that will be realized under state θ according to
the limiting model of i. The idea here is intuitive. Individual i is almost certain that, if the
state is θ, then the realized frequency will be around pi
θ and he will assign nearly probability
1t oθ. For the other individual j to agree with him, she must also assign nearly probability 1
to θ at those frequencies, which requires that her likelihood ratio, R
j
θ,θ0,m, is nearly 0 at those











In Theorem 6, the uniform convergence assumption is not superﬂuous for either direction
of the characterization, as the next counterexample shows.
25Example 2 (Counterexample to Necessity) Without uniform convergence, there may be
asymptotic agreement even if R
j





1/m + m(1 − 1/m) if p ∈
¡
ˆ pm − 1




where ˆ pm =3 /4 − 1/m. The limiting asymptotic likelihood ratio, R
j
θ,θ0,∞, is identically 1.
Nevertheless, agreement is continuous under {Fi
θ,m} because the individuals have the same
m o d e lo fl e a r n i n g .
(Counterexample to Suﬃciency) Without uniform convergence, asymptotic agreement
m a yf a i le v e ni fR
j






xm if pθ,θ ∈
¡
ˆ pi
m − 1/m, ˆ pm +1 /m
¢
1/m if pθ,θ ∈ [1/2,1]\
¡
ˆ pi
m − 7/m, ˆ pm +7 /m
¢
1/m2 otherwise
for large m where ˆ p1
m =3 /4+1 4 /m, ˆ p2
m =3 /4+1 8 /m,a n dxm is such that fi
θ,m is a density
function. One can check that R
j
θ,θ0,∞ (ρ)=0whenever ρθ > 1/2. Nevertheless, agreement is
still strongly discontinuous under {Fi
θ,m}.
We next explore the implications of the characterization results in Theorem 6 in the context
of a canonical example.
5.3 A Canonical Example
As in the Binary Example, we take Θ = {A,B} and Σ = {a,b}. We consider a class of
“symmetric” families {Fi








1 − ˆ pi, ˆ pi¢
for some ˆ pi ∈ (1/2,1). The family is parameterized by a determining
density function f : R → R that is strictly positive, symmetric around zero, and monotone in
the tails. The subjective density function fi
θ,m is then induced by f and the transformation
x 7→
¡







ρθ − ˆ pi¢¢
(11)






ρθ − ˆ pi¢¢
dρθ is a correction factor to ensure that fi
θ,m is a proper
probability density function on ∆(Σ). Here, the mapping x 7→
¡
x − ˆ pi¢
/m scales down the
real line around ˆ pi by the factor 1/m, scaling down the uncertainty about pθ by 1/m.A s
m →∞ , the uncertainty vanishes and Fi
θ,m converges to δpi
θ.W h e nˆ p1 =ˆ p2, the individuals
have the same subjective densities, leading trivially to asymptotic agreement. To analyze
26the continuity of asymptotic agreement at certainty, we will assume ˆ p1 6=ˆ p2.D e ﬁne ˆ x ≡
ˆ p1 +ˆ p2 − 1 >
¯ ¯ˆ p1 − ˆ p2¯ ¯ ≡ ˆ y>0.













ˆ p1 +ˆ p2 − 1
¢¢





Hence, under the uniform convergence assumption, whether asymptotic agreement is continu-
ous at certainty under {Fi






This is a familiar condition in statistics. Whether it is satisﬁed depends on whether f has
rapidly-varying (exponential) or regularly-varying (polynomial) tails:





= H(x) ∈ R ∀x>0.
The condition that H (x) ∈ R is relatively weak, but nonetheless has important implica-
tions. In particular, it implies that H(x) ≡ x−α for α ∈ (0,∞).20 Moreover, Seneta (1976)
shows that the convergence in Deﬁnition 4 is uniform on any compact set. Therefore, if f has
regularly-varying tails, then R
j
θ,θ0,m converges uniformly to R
j








=( ˆ x/ˆ y)
−α > 0
for some α ∈ (0,∞). Our characterization then shows that asymptotic agreement is strongly
discontinuous it certainty under {Fi
θ,m}. Many common distributions, including the Pareto,
log-normal, and t-distributions, have regularly-varying densities.









0 if x > 1
1 if x =1
∞ if x < 1.
Once again, the convergence is uniform on compact intervals that exclude x =1(as in our
case), and hence each R
j










=( ˆ x/ˆ y)
−∞ =0 .
20The proof of this claim is provided in our working paper. See, for example, De Haan (1970).
27Our characterization then shows that if f has rapidly varying tails, then agreement is contin-
uous under {Fi
θ,m}. Examples of densities with rapidly-varying tails include the exponential
and the normal densities.
Therefore, whether there is asymptotic agreement depends on the tails:
1. If f has regularly-varying tails, then agreement is continuous at certainty under {Fi
θ,m}.
2. If f has rapidly-varying tails, then agreement is strongly discontinuous at certainty under
{Fi
θ,m}.







¢ ∼ = 0. That is, whether i thinks that the frequency that will be realized at
state θ (namely pi
θ) will convince the other individual j,t o o ,t h a tt h es t a t ei sθ.N o w ,s i n c e
ˆ y =
¯ ¯ˆ pi − ˆ pj¯ ¯ <
¯ ¯ˆ pi −
¡
1 − ˆ pj¢¯ ¯ =ˆ x, j also considers frequency pi
θ as an evidence for state θ.
For large m, the strength of this evidence depends on the tail of f. Rapidly-varying tails are
increasingly informative. Any diﬀerence between ˆ x and ˆ y is magniﬁed as we go to the tail
frequencies (as m increases). Hence, as m →∞ , j infers from the frequency pi
θ that the state







=0 ). On the other hand, informativeness remains nearly constant on
regularly-varying tails. Hence, increasing m does not make the frequency pi
θ correspond to







remains around (ˆ x/ˆ y)
−α, bounded away from 0.
Even in the limit m →∞ , j assigns a signiﬁcant probability to the other state, leading to a
signiﬁcant asymptotic disagreement.
To illustrate the nature of asymptotic disagreement under regularly-varying tails further,
consider the Pareto distribution with some α>0. This is particularly relevant, since all
distributions with regularly-varying tails behave similar to the Pareto-distribution for large m.
For simplicity, suppose π1
A = π2





ρθ (s)+ˆ pi − 1
ρθ (s) − ˆ pi
¶−α
,




ρθ (s) − ˆ pi¢−α
(ρθ (s) − ˆ pi)
−α +( ρθ (s)+ˆ pi − 1)
−α
for all m. As illustrated in Figure 2, in this case φi
θ,∞,m is not monotone. To see the magnitude
of asymptotic disagreement, consider ρθ (s) ∼ = ˆ pi.I nt h a tc a s e ,φi
θ,∞,m (ρ(s)) is approximately







Figure 2: limn→∞ φi
n (s) for Pareto distribution as a function of ρ(s) [for α =2 , ˆ pi =3 /4].
1, and φ
j
θ,∞,m (ρ(s)) is approximately ˆ y−α/(ˆ x−α +ˆ y−α). Hence, both individuals believe that




¯ ¯ ∼ =
ˆ x−α
ˆ x−α +ˆ y−α.
This asymptotic diﬀerence is increasing with the diﬀerence ˆ y ≡
¯ ¯ˆ p1 − ˆ p2¯ ¯, which corresponds
to the diﬀerence in the individuals’ views on which frequencies of signals are most likely. It is
also clear from this expression that this asymptotic diﬀerence will converge to zero as ˆ y → 0
(i.e., as ˆ p1 → ˆ p2).21
5.4 Robustness of Agreement in the Medium Run
We have so far established that asymptotic agreement in standard models is fragile in the
sense that there may be substantial asymptotic disagreement when one introduces a small
amount of uncertainty. In the latter model, the amount of disagreement eventually exceeds a
predetermined level, casting doubt on the notion that beliefs of diﬀerent individuals become
eventually similar as they observe the same public information. Nevertheless, it is possible
that even in the model with divergent asymptotic beliefs, the individuals’ beliefs may be quite
similar for a long while before they eventually diverge. Then, one may be able to use the
common-prior assumption as an approximation in the medium run, after suﬃcient amount
of learning, but before beliefs eventually diverge. We will now show that this is indeed the
case whenever there is asymptotic agreement in the limiting standard model. In other words,
21The working paper paper version shows that in this canonical example asymptotic disagreement will be
small for large m whenever ˆ y is small.
29medium-run agreement is continuous at certainty. (Below Ei
m is the expectation operator under
Pri
m,a n dδpi
θ is the Dirac measure that puts probability 1 on pi
θ.)









that there is asymptotic agreement under (δpi
θ)θ∈Θ,i∈{1,2} (e.g. p1 = p2 and pi
θ 6= pi
θ0 for all
distinct θ and θ0). Let {Fi
θ,m} be any family converging to δpi
θ. Then, for every ε>0 and








<ε (∀m>¯ m,∀n ∈ {¯ n, ¯ n +1 ,...,¯ n + N}).







<ε (∀m>¯ m,∀n ∈ {¯ n, ¯ n +1 ,...,¯ n + N}).
Imagine two individuals who face a small amount of uncertainty about the conditional
signal distributions, but their beliefs are similar to those in a standard model. A signiﬁcant
amount of belief diﬀerences may remain early in the process because it takes time to reduce the
initial belief diﬀerences. Their beliefs may also eventually diverge as in the Binary Example.
Despite this, Theorem 7 establishes that, in between these two ends, their beliefs will remain
arbitrarily close to each other for an arbitrarily long period of time, provided that the amount
of uncertainty is suﬃciently small.
The idea of the proof is simple. Firstly, in the standard model, the expected disagreement
between the individuals’ beliefs vanishes as n →∞ ,s ot h a ti tb e c o m e sl e s st h a nε/2 when
n exceeds some ¯ n.M o r e o v e r , f o r a ﬁxed n, since the asymptotic beliefs are continuous and
bounded, as m →∞ , the expected disagreement in the model with uncertainty converges to
the one under the standard model, so that it becomes within ε/2 neighborhood of the latter
diﬀerence when m exceeds some ¯ mn. Hence, the expected disagreement (in both models) will
be less than ε whenever m ≥ ¯ mn and n ≥ ¯ n. Therefore, when m ≥ max¯ n≤n≤¯ n+N ¯ mn,t h e
expected amount of disagreement will be less than ε for each n in between ¯ n and ¯ n + N.
As n grows, in the standard model, the expected disagreement diminishes and vanishes
eventually. In a nearby model with small uncertainty, the expected diﬀerence also diminishes
and becomes very small for a long while (because it remains close to the one in the standard
model), but it may eventually grow larger and become substantial. In a sense, small diﬀer-
ences between the two models build up and lead to a substantial diﬀerence eventually as the


































































































Expected Level of Disagreement (with Player 1s Beliefs)










Figure 3: Ex-ante expected disagreement in the Binary Example of Section 3.2 for   = λ =1 /m.
For an illustration, consider the Binary Example of Section 3.2 for   = λ =1 /m.T a k e
π1
A =2 /3 and π2
A =1 /3 as the prior beliefs. In Figure 3, we plot the ex-ante expected value of
the disagreement aftern n observations as a function of m and n. (The value on the contour
indicates the expected disagreement along the contour.) For any ﬁxed m, as the individuals
observe more signals, the expected disagreement decreases ﬁrst and starts increasing after a
while, eventually approaching 5/9. As m increases (and uncertainty decreases), it takes longer
for the asymptotic eﬀect to take over, allowing the expected disagreement to decrease to lower
values and stay low longer before increasing. Theorem 7 shows that this period becomes
arbitrarily long as m →∞ . Remarkably, however, even when m is around 1000, so that the
individuals know probabilities upto the third digits, the expected disagreement starts growing
rapidly only after 30 observations or so.
6 Concluding Remarks
The standard approach in game theory and economic modeling assumes that individuals have a
“common prior,” meaning that they have beliefs consistent with each other regarding the game
forms, institutions, and possible distributions of payoﬀ-relevant parameters. This presumption
is often justiﬁed by the argument that suﬃcient common experiences and observations, either
31through individual observations or transmission of information from others, will eliminate
disagreements, taking agents towards common priors. It receives support from a number of
well-known theorems in statistics, such as Savage (1954) and Blackwell and Dubins (1962).
Nevertheless, existing results assume that conditional distribution (i.e., “interpretations”)
of signals are known. This is suﬃcient to ensure that payoﬀ-relevant parameters (states)
can be identiﬁed from limiting frequencies of signals. In many situations, individuals are not
only learning about payoﬀ-relevant parameters but also about the interpretation of diﬀerent
signals–i.e., learning would be taking place under uncertainty. For example, many signals
favoring a particular interpretation might make individuals suspicious that the signals come
from a biased source. This may prevent full identiﬁcation (in the standard sense of the term
in econometrics and statistics). In such situations, information will be useful to individuals
but may not lead to full learning.
This paper investigates the conditions under which learning under uncertainty will take
individuals towards common priors and asymptotic agreement. We consider an environment
in which two individuals with diﬀerent priors observe the same inﬁnite sequence of signals
informative about some underlying parameter. However, learning is under uncertainty in the
sense that each individual has a non-degenerate subjective probability distribution over the
likelihood of diﬀerent signals given the values of the parameter. When subjective probability
distributions of both individuals have full support, they will never agree, even after observing
t h es a m ei n ﬁnite sequence of signals.
Our main results provide conditions under which a small amount of uncertainty may lead to
a substantial (non-vanishing) amount of asymptotic disagreement, namely asymptotic agree-
ment is discontinuous at certainty. We ﬁrst show that asymptotic agreement is discontinuous
(and thus fragile) at certainty for every model. In particular, a vanishingly small amount of
uncertainty about the signal distribution can guarantee that both individuals attach probabil-
ity arbitrarily close to 1 that there will be a signiﬁcant amount of asymptotic disagreement.
Under an additional uniform convergence assumption, we also characterize the conditions un-
der which asymptotic agreement is continuous at certainty. According to our characterization,
asymptotic disagreement may prevail even as the amount of uncertainty vanishes, depending
on the tail properties of the families of subjective probability distributions. These results imply
learning foundations of common priors are not as strong as generally presumed.
32Appendix: Proofs

















































Here, the ﬁrst equality is obtained by dividing the numerator and the denominator by the same term.
The resulting expression on the numerator is the conditional expectation of fi
θ0(pθ0) given rn under
the ﬂat (Lebesgue) prior on pθ0 and the Bernoulli distribution on {st}
n
t=1.D e n o t i n gt h i sb yEλ[fi
θ0|rn],
and the denominator, which is similarly deﬁned as the conditional expectation of fθ (pθ),b yEλ[fi
θ|rn],
we obtain the last equality. By Doob’s consistency theorem for Bayesian posterior expectation of the
parameter, as rn → ρ (that is, as rσ,n → ρσ for each σ ∈ Σ), we have that Eλ[fi
θ0|rn] → fθ0(ρ) and
Eλ[fi
θ|rn] → fi
θ(ρ) (Doob (1949) shows the convergence for almost all ρ, and Diaconis and Freedman









as deﬁned in (5). Equation (4) then follows from (3).
Proof of Theorem 1. Throughout the proof, Assumptions 2 and 3 are imposed. We ﬁrst develop
the necessary notation.






For every ρ ∈ Ui,w r i t epi (ρ) for the unique member of Pi(ρ) and θ
i (ρ) for the unique θ with pi (ρ) ∈
supp(Fi





































We will use following lemmas in our proof.





θi(ρ),θ0,n (rn (s)) → 0.















is closed, this implies that there exist open neighborhoods Vp and Vρ of pi (ρ) and ρ,
respectively, such that
ˆ H ≡ sup
ρ0∈Vρ,p∈Vp
H (ρ0,p) < inf
ρ0∈Vρ,p∈supp(F i
θ0)
H (ρ0,p) ≡ ˆ H0.
33Since rn (s)/n → ρ,t h e r ee x i s t s¯ n<∞ such that rn (s)/n ∈ Vρ for all n>¯ n.T a k ea n yn>¯ n. Then,
by deﬁnition of ˆ H0, Z
e−H(rn(s)/n,p)ndFi














where the ﬁrst equality is by non-negativity of exponential function and the second inequality is by
deﬁnition of ˆ H.N o t e t h a t s i n c e pi (ρ) ∈ supp(Fi
θi(ρ)) and Vp is an open neighborhood of pi (ρ),b y





> 0. Substituting (16) and (17) in deﬁnition (15), we then obtain
¯ Ri














Since ˆ H0 > ˆ H, the right-hand side goes to zero, showing that Ri
θi(ρ),θ0,n (rn (s)) → 0. QED
Lemma 3 For any i and s ∈ ¯ S with ρ(s) ∈ Ui,a sn →∞ , φ
i
θi(ρ(s)),n (s) → 1.
P r o o fo fL e m m a : This lemma follows from Lemma 2 and (14). QED
We are now ready to prove the theorem.
(Proof of Part 1) Take any θ. Firstly, by Doob’s consistency theorem,
Pr
i ¡













, Pi(ρ)={ρ}, yielding ρ ∈ Ui with pi (ρ)=ρ and θ
i (ρ)=θ. Then,








(Proof of Part 2: Suﬃciency) Take any ˆ θ. By Assumption 3, supp(Fi
ˆ θ) ⊆ Uj. Assume that for
every ρ ∈ supp(Fi
ˆ θ) ⊆ Uj, Pj(ρ) ⊆ supp(F
j
ˆ θ),s ot h a tθ
j (ρ)=ˆ θ.S i n c e ρ ∈ supp(Fi
ˆ θ), θ
i (ρ)=ˆ θ as
in part 1. Then, whenever rn (s)/n → ρ(s) ∈ supp(Fi
ˆ θ), by Lemma 3, φ
i
ˆ θ,n(s) → 1 and φ
j















¯ ¯ → 0|ˆ θ
´
=1 .







¯ ¯ → 0
¢
=1 .
(Proof of Part 2: Necessity) Suppose that for some ˆ θ and ˆ ρ ∈ supp(Fi




j (ˆ ρ) 6= ˆ θ = θ
i (ˆ ρ).R e c a l l t h a t ˆ ρ ∈ Ui and ˆ ρ ∈ Uj (by Assumption 3), with well-deﬁned
θ
i (ˆ ρ) and θ
j (ˆ ρ).N o w ,s i n c eH is continuous, Pj is upper-semicontinuous. Hence, there exists an open
neighborhood ˆ V ⊂ Uj of ˆ ρ such that θ
j (ρ)=θ
j (ˆ ρ) 6= ˆ θ for each ρ ∈ ˆ V .T h u s ,f o ra n ys ∈ ¯ S with ρ(s) ∈
ˆ V ∩ supp(Fi
ˆ θ), Lemma 3 implies that φ
i
ˆ θ,n(s) → 1 and φ
j
θj(ˆ ρ),n (s) → 1,s ot h a t
¯ ¯ ¯φ
1
ˆ θ,n(s) − φ
2
ˆ θ,n(s)
¯ ¯ ¯ → 1.




ρ(s) ∈ ˆ V ∩ supp(Fi
ˆ θ)|ˆ θ
´





ˆ θ,n(s) − φ
2
ˆ θ,n(s)
¯ ¯ ¯ → 1
´
> 0,
34and thus contradicting asymptotic agreement.
Proof of Theorem 2. (Proof of Part 1) This part immediately follows from Lemma 1, as each
πi
θ0fθ0 (ρ(s)) is positive, and πi
θfθ (ρ(s)) is ﬁnite.














θ. There is an open and dense set of parameters for which the equality on
t h er i g h t - h a n ds i d ei ss a t i s ﬁed only at a set of frequencies ρ(s) with Lebesgue measure zero. Since
we have densities, in any such case, Pr









=1for i =1 ,2.





with ε>0 and θ 6= θ








=0 .L e t V be a neighborhood of pi
θ such that pi
θ0 6∈ ¯ V ,w h e r e¯ V is
the closure of V .D e ﬁne
Dm =
©
ρ ∈ V |Ri

















































where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the fact that Ri
θ,θ0,m = fi
θ0/fi
θ ≥ ε on Dm and the second





























→ 0. Likewise, since Fi
θ → δpi
θ and pi
θ ∈ V , Pr
i
m (V |θ) →
1. Therefore, the upper bound goes to 0, completing the proof.
Proof of Theorem 4. Pick sequences pi







° ° ° >










° °p − pi
θ,m
° ° ≤ ¯  /m
ª
,
which will be the set of likely frequencies at state θ according to i.N o t i c et h a tDi
θ,m ∩ D
j
θ0,m 6= ∅ iﬀ
θ = θ









θ,m is normalized so that fi


















35if ρ ∈ Di
θ,m for some θ and φ
i
∞,m (ρ)=πi otherwise. Note that φ
i
θ,∞,m (ρ) → 1 if ρ ∈ Di
θ,m.M o r e o v e r ,
since the sets Di
θ,m and D
j
θ0,m are disjoint for each θ
0, φ
j
∞,m (ρ)=πj when ρ ∈ Di
θ,m. Hence, there










































For the second part of the theorem, take π1 6= π2. Then, by construction, for each ρ,
° °φ
i







° °π1 − π2° °ª
> 0, showing that agreement almost-surely discontinuous under {Fi
θ,m}.






xθ/λ if ρθ ∈
£
ˆ pi








0 6= θ, ε = λ =1 /m, ˆ p1
A =ˆ pA + λ, ˆ p1
B =ˆ pB − λ, ˆ p2
A =ˆ pA − λ, ˆ p2







1 − ˆ pi
θ0 − λ/2
¢




⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
1/ε2 if ρα < 1 − ˆ pi
B − λ/2,
xB/ε2 if 1 − ˆ pi
B − λ/2 ≤ ρa ≤ 1 − ˆ pi
B + λ/2,
1 if 1 − ˆ pi
B + λ/2 <ρ a < ˆ pi
A − λ/2,
ε2/xA if ˆ pi
A − λ/2 ≤ ρa ≤ ˆ pi
A + λ/2,
ε2 if ρa > ˆ pi
A + λ/2,
which is clearly decreasing in ρa when m is large. For ε ∼ = 0,w eh a v e
Ri




∞ if ρa ≤ 1 − ˆ pi
B + λ/2,
1 if 1 − ˆ pi
B + λ/2 <ρ a < ˆ pi
A − λ/2,









0 if ρ ≤ 1 − ˆ pi
B + λ/2,
πi if 1 − ˆ pi
B + λ/2 <ρ<ˆ pi
A − λ/2,
1 if ρ ≥ ˆ pi
A − λ/2.
Notice that when ρa ∈
£
ˆ p2
A − λ/2, ˆ p2
A + λ/2
¤
,w eh a v eρa < ˆ p1
A − λ/2,s ot h a tφ
2
A,∞,m (ρ) ∼ = 1 and
φ
1




A,∞,m (ρ) − φ
2
A,∞,m (ρ)
¯ ¯ ∼ = 1−π1
A. Similarly, when ρa ∈
£
1 − ˆ p1






A,∞,m (ρ) ∼ = 0 and φ
2
A,∞,m (ρ) ∼ = π2
A,s ot h a t
¯ ¯φ
1
A,∞,m (ρ) − φ
2
A,∞,m (ρ)
¯ ¯ ∼ = π2
A.I n o r d e r t o













A,∞,m (ρ) − φ
2
A,∞,m (ρ)









1 − ˆ p1












A,∞,m (ρ) − φ
2
A,∞,m (ρ)































ˆ θ,∞,m > 1 − ε,φ
2
ˆ θ,∞,m > 1 − ε|ˆ θ
´
=1 , (21)










¯ ¯ <ε |ˆ θ
´
=1 .





















ˆ θ,θ,m <ε |ˆ θ
´
=1 . (22)
Since Proposition 3 has established (22) for j = i already, we only need to prove (22) for j 6= i.S i n c e
R
j
ˆ θ,θ,m converges uniformly to R
j
ˆ θ,θ,∞ and each R
j
ˆ θ,θ,m is continuous, R
j
ˆ θ,θ,∞ is continuous at pi
ˆ θ. Hence,
t h e r ee x i s t sa no p e nn e i g h b o r h o o dˆ V ⊂ V i
ˆ θ of pi
ˆ θ such that R
j
ˆ θ,θ,∞ (ρ) <ε / 2 for each ρ ∈ ˆ V .S i n c eR
j
ˆ θ,θ,m
converges uniformly to R
j
ˆ θ,θ,∞ over ˆ V , this implies that there exists ¯ m<∞ such that R
j
ˆ θ,θ,m (ρ) <ε
for each ρ ∈ ˆ V and m>¯ m. But since Fi
ˆ θ,m converges to δpi






ˆ V |ˆ θ
´
→ 1, proving (22).







6=0for some i 6= j and θ 6= θ
0. We will show that



























showing that agreement is discontinuous at certainty under {Fi

































θ,θ0,∞ to conclude that there exist an open neighborhood ˆ V ⊂ V i
θ of pi










/2 for all ρ ∈ ˆ V and for all m>¯ m.B u tf o ra n ys u c hm and ρ, φ
j
θ,∞,m (ρ) <














θ,∞,m (ρ) < 1 − 2ε0|θ
´
=1 . (24)













θ,∞,m < 1 − 2ε0 and φ
i






¯ ¯ >ε 0. Therefore, (24) and
(25) imply (23), completing the proof of Part 1.







6=0for all i 6= j and θ 6= θ









¯ ¯ >ε 1|θ
¢

























° ° >ε 1
¢
=1 ,

































<ε 2. In our proof we will use Ei
∞ and φ
i
n,∞ for the expectation op-
erator and the posterior belief at n, respectively, under the standard model (δpi
























where the ﬁrst equality is by the Bounded Convergence Theorem, and the second equality is by







° ° =0almost surely.
Next, we introduce:
































































+ ε/2 <ε / 2+ε/2=ε.
This establishes the desired result. The proof is completed by providing a proof for the Claim.


































∞ (rn) > 0, (28)
where Pr
i



































































¯ ¯ ¯ ¯.




































































Since maxθ is continuous, one more application of the Continuous Mapping Theorem yields (27), proving
the Claim. This completes the proof of the theorem.
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